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The recent economic crisis has increased the needfor countries and international organizations to
find better solutions for tackling tax evasion due to the
illicit flow of capital resulting from the use of tax ha-
vens and offshore financial centers.1 The economic cri-
sis also has heightened the need to prevent bank se-
crecy. Consequently, governments2 and international
organizations3 have placed higher on the political
agenda the importance of achieving more transparency
and exchange of information by increasing interna-
tional tax cooperation.4
At the international level, organizations such as the
OECD, the United Nations, and the European Union
are presenting their own solutions in order to enhance
global cooperation on taxation. For instance, while the
OECD decided to start a peer review of the applica-
tion of the OECD standards for transparency and ex-
change of information in at least 100 jurisdictions —
including OECD and non-OECD countries — the Eu-
ropean Commission decided to present a communica-
tion that deals with the introduction of good gover-
nance in tax matters.5 The communication was
adopted by resolution of the European Parliament.6
For the EU, in order to protect the financial system
from noncooperative jurisdictions and tax havens, ac-
tion needs to be taken to achieve international good
governance in the tax area. Such action includes en-
couraging transparency, exchange of information, and
1Even though a tax haven can also be regarded as an offshore
financial center, there are differences in the two concepts. Off-
shore financial centers ‘‘reduce revenue available to developing
countries where they act as a destination for income streams and
wealth protected by a lack of transparency and show a refusal or
inability to exchange information with revenue authorities who
may have taxing rights in respect of that income or those assets.’’
OECD, ‘‘Promoting Transparency and Exchange of Information
for Tax Purposes: A Background Information Brief,’’ Apr. 21,
2010, at 6.
2For example, in the G-20 summits in Washington, London,
and Pittsburgh, and G-8 summits in L’Aquila and Lecce (Italy)
and Hokkaido (Japan), political leaders expressed their commit-
ment to tackle tax evasion, and their willingness to take action
against noncooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens, and
against those countries that do not meet OECD international
standards for transparency and exchange of information.
3In October 2009, a global conference on ‘‘Financial Institu-
tions and Instruments — Tax Challenges and Solutions’’ was
organized by the International Tax Dialogue. This conference
explored the weaknesses and strengths of the existing interna-
tional architecture of taxation in this area, questioned the extent
to which tax policies may have contributed to the current finan-
cial crisis, and sought to develop forward-looking solutions to
identified problems. The International Tax Dialogue is a collabo-
rative arrangement involving the EU, IMF, OECD, and World
Bank to encourage and facilitate discussion of tax matters
among national tax officials, international organizations, and
other key stakeholders.
4OECD, supra note 1, at 2.
5Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social
Committee; ‘‘Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters’’
COM(2009) 201 final, Brussels, Apr. 28, 2009.
6European Parliament Resolution, Feb. 10, 2010, on Promot-
ing Good Governance in Tax Matters; P7 TA 2010 (0020).
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fair tax competition in the global arena. The EU com-
munication and resolution encourage transparency and
exchange of information not only for EU countries and
potential candidates, but also for third countries that
require EU development aid or countries that conclude
agreements with the EU or with EU member states.
The U.N. is following to some extent the OECD ap-
proach; it has also decided to introduce a new Code of
Conduct on Cooperation in Combating International
Tax Evasion, which will be applicable to developing
countries.
This article reviews the current work on interna-
tional tax cooperation carried out by the OECD, the
EU, and the U.N. The article also presents and com-
pares the EU communication and resolution, and it
analyzes the reasoning behind the adoption by the
commission and European Parliament of the principles
to promote good governance in tax matters. This piece
also discusses some recommendations for further re-
search on international tax cooperation. The main fo-
cus of the essay is the EU work to promote good gov-
ernance in tax matters. In order to provide a broad
perspective on the current work on international tax
cooperation, the article will address and compare the
OECD and the U.N. proposals on transparency and
exchange of information. Given that the U.N. follows
to some extent the OECD’s approach, this essay will
only present some of the important issues in which the
U.N.’s work on international tax cooperation deviates
from the work of the OECD.
I. International Tax Cooperation
A. OECD
In order to tackle tax evasion, bilateral and multilat-
eral tax solutions are required. More than 10 years ago,
the OECD introduced international tax cooperation
measures. Today, these measures are the standards of
transparency and exchange of information contained in
article 26 of the OECD model tax convention (the
OECD model) and the 2002 OECD Agreement on
Exchange of Information on Tax Matters (OECD
TIEA). The roots of this project on international tax
cooperation may be found in the report analyzing pref-
erential regimes and identifying tax havens presented
by the OECD in 1998. As a result of this report, the
relevant countries decided to negotiate bilateral tax
treaties containing exchange-of-information and trans-
parency provisions as stated in article 26 of the OECD
model and to conclude agreements based on the 2002
OECD TIEA. In general terms, the OECD standards
require the following:
• exchange of information on request when it is
‘‘foreseeably relevant’’ in accordance to the do-
mestic laws of the treaty partner;
• no restrictions on exchange caused by bank se-
crecy or domestic tax interest requirements;
• availability of reliable information and powers to
obtain it;
• respect for taxpayers’ rights; and
• strict confidentiality of information exchanged.7
For the OECD, ‘‘better transparency and informa-
tion exchange for tax purposes are key to ensuring that
taxpayers have no safe haven to hide their income and
assets and that they pay the right amount of tax in the
right place.’’8 Under this framework of cooperation,
tax havens, offshore financial centers, and bank secrecy
are being tackled. The OECD standards have been
adopted by governments in the G-8 and G-20 meet-
ings. According to the OECD, these standards are uni-
versally endorsed, and hundreds of tax information
exchange agreements have been concluded. Even juris-
dictions opposed to exchanging bank information (such
as Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Brazil,
Chile, and Thailand) and jurisdictions that frequently
act as offshore financial centers (such as the Cayman
Islands, British Virgin Islands, and Bermuda) are par-
ticipating in the effort.9
In order to make comparisons with the EU pro-
posals to promote good governance in tax matters, the
general features of both article 26 of the OECD model
and the OECD TIEA are presented below.
1. Article 26 of the OECD Model
Generally, article 26 of the OECD model states that
the scope of information exchanged includes taxes of
every type and description; that is, national and subna-
tional taxes (paragraph 1). Some exceptions to informa-
tion exchange have been removed, including the excep-
tion for domestic bank secrecy laws (paragraph 5).
Article 6 of the OECD model also states that the ex-
change of information is on request. Nevertheless, the
OECD commentary states that it is possible to have
other forms of exchange, such as spontaneous or auto-
matic.10
2. 2002 OECDTIEA
The 2002 OECD TIEA contains a standard of what
constitutes effective exchange of information, but it
does not prescribe a specific format on how this stand-
ard should be achieved.
The OECD TIEA is ‘‘only one of several ways in
which the standard can be implemented. Other instru-
ments, including double taxation agreements, may also
be used provided both parties agreed to do so, given
7OECD, supra note 1, at 4.
8Id., at Annex V. For a list of the countries that have imple-
mented the standards, see the OECD website at http://
www.oecd.org.
9OECD, supra note 1, at 3 and 4.
10OECD commentary to article 26, paras. 9 and 9.1.
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that other instruments are usually wider in scope.’’11
This means that countries may choose whether to con-
clude TIEAs or bilateral tax treaties in which the con-
tents of article 26 of the OECD model are introduced.
Article 5 of the OECD TIEA provides only for ex-
change of information upon request (paragraph 1 ar-
ticle 5); however, the commentary to article 5 of the
OECD TIEA states that ‘‘the Contracting Parties may
wish to consider expanding their co-operation in mat-
ters of information exchange for tax purposes by cover-
ing automatic and spontaneous exchanges and simulta-
neous tax examinations.’’12 Thus, as in the OECD
commentary to article 26, the commentary to article 5
of the OECD TIEA makes it possible for the parties to
agree on other forms of exchange of information that
will cover automatic or spontaneous exchange of infor-
mation. Further reference to these forms of informa-
tion exchange will be made in the comparison of the
EU and OECD, which will be presented in Section
III.B below.
The OECD TIEA contains both a multilateral and a
bilateral model of agreements. A multilateral agree-
ment provides the basis for an integrated bundle of tax
treaties to which parties are bound insofar as those par-
ties have mutually identified each other in their instru-
ments of ratification, approval, and acceptance. Thus,
multilateral agreement does not mean multilateral
agreement in the traditional sense (that is, one agree-
ment for all parties). Instead, this multilateral version
makes it possible for a party to be bound to the specific
parties to which it wishes to be bound. Until now, no
TIEA in a multilateral version have been signed, and
the reason for the OECD can be the novelty of the
multilateral approach.13 The bilateral version is a
model for bilateral exchange-of-information agreements
and can be modified in accordance with the wishes of
the parties entering into the agreement. In principle,
not all countries were willing to sign these TIEAs, and
therefore, a list of jurisdictions that were not substan-
tially implementing the OECD standards was pub-
lished. In order to be removed from that list, a jurisdic-
tion must have ‘‘substantially implemented’’ the OECD
standards (that is, signed at least 12 TIEAs). Since
April 2009, 25 jurisdictions have substantially imple-
mented the OECD standards and have been removed
from that list as of April 2010.14
3. Global Forum
The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange
of Information was created in 2000 with OECD and
non-OECD countries. This forum meets annually, and
the last meeting took place in Mexico on September
1-2, 2009. In that meeting, a self-standing secretariat
based in the OECD was established, and the attendees
agreed on reviewing the effective implementation of
the OECD standards by means of carrying out a moni-
toring and peer review of at least 100 jurisdictions that
have implemented these standards. This review will
take place in two phases: first, to review the quality of
a jurisdiction’s legal and regulatory framework for the
exchange of information; and second, to review the
practical application of this framework. This review
was launched in March 2010 for the first group of 18
countries.15 Thus, it should be reasonably expected that
in the coming years, more attention will be given to
international tax cooperation not only as a result of
the financial crisis, but also as a result of the OECD
work on promoting the standards for transparency and
exchange of information.
B. United Nations
For developing countries, the U.N. Committee of
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters
adopted article 26 of the OECD model in 2008.16 As a
result, article 26 of the U.N. model was introduced
with a revised commentary by the U.N. committee that
will be included in the next version of the U.N. Model
Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and
Developing Countries. Even though the proposed ar-
ticle 26 of the U.N. model substantially follows article
26 of the OECD model — and therefore, the OECD
commentary is relevant in interpreting article 26 of the
U.N. model — article 26 of the U.N. model is broader
on some issues in comparison to article 26 of the
OECD model. The following section provides a de-
scription of the issues in which article 26 of the
OECD model and article 26 of the U.N. model differ.
1. Article 26 of the U.N. Model
Article 26, paragraph 1 of the U.N. model contains
an additional sentence stating that ‘‘in particular, infor-
mation shall be exchanged that would be helpful to a
Contracting State in preventing avoidance or evasion of
such taxes.’’ In contrast, article 26 of the OECD model
does not include such a sentence or any reference to
the purposes of exchange of information. According to
the U.N. committee, this additional sentence is in-
tended to provide guidance to the contracting states on
the proper interpretation of the article.17 The U.N.
committee considers that mutual assistance in combat-
ing tax evasion and tax avoidance are important not
11OECD TIEA, introduction number 5.
12Commentary to article 5, para. 39 of the TIEA.
13OECD, supra note 1, at 7.
14Id., at 4, and Annex II, at 14.
15These countries are Australia, Barbados, Bermuda,
Botswana, Canada, Cayman Islands, Denmark, Germany, India,
Ireland, Jamaica, Jersey, Mauritius, Monaco, Norway, Panama,
Qatar, and Trinidad and Tobago.
16Fourth session of the Committee of Experts on Interna-
tional Cooperation in Tax Matters, Geneva, Oct. 20-24, 2008.
172008 revised commentary to article 26 of the U.N. model,
paras. 4.2 and 4.3.
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only for helping countries to examine whether an ag-
gressive tax structure results in tax avoidance or tax
evasion, but also for providing more knowledge to law-
makers on how to close possible tax loopholes.18
Also, article 26 of the U.N. model contains an addi-
tional provision to paragraph 6, stating that ‘‘the com-
petent authorities shall, through consultation, develop
appropriate methods and techniques concerning the
matters in respect of which exchanges of information
under paragraph 1 shall be made.’’ According to the
U.N. committee, the reason for this language is to au-
thorize the competent authorities to exchange informa-
tion on request, automatic or spontaneous.19 Further,
in its commentary to article 26, the U.N. committee
states that if the state wants to introduce information
exchange not only on request, but also automatically or
spontaneously, those countries may wish to add the
following language to the end of paragraph 6:
In addition to responding to specific requests for
information, the competent authorities shall ex-
change information on a routine and spontaneous
basis. They shall agree from time to time on the
types of information or documents which shall be
furnished on a routine basis.20
Given the concern of some developing nations re-
garding the extraordinary costs that automatic or spon-
taneous information exchange may create for the tax
administration of those countries, it could be agreed
that those extraordinary costs should be assumed by
the country that requests the information. For this pur-
pose, an additional standard provision can be included
as follows:
Extraordinary costs incurred in providing infor-
mation shall be borne by the Contracting Party
which requests the information. The competent
authorities of the Contracting Parties shall con-
sult with each other in advance if the costs of
providing information with respect to a specific
request are expected to be extraordinary.21
2. The Code of Conduct
In October 2009, the U.N. committee approved the
U.N. Code of Conduct on Cooperation in Combating
International Tax Evasion.22 This code contains a com-
mitment of countries:
• to exchange information in criminal and civil tax
matters23;
• to have appropriate confidentiality rules for infor-
mation exchanged; and
• to ensure that reliable information such as bank
account, ownership, identity, and relevant ac-
counting information would be available in re-
sponse to a specific request.24
The code states that countries should commit to a
minimum level of cooperation that is accepted by the
U.N., but individually, countries may aspire to a higher
level of cooperation than the one presented in the
code. This code provides for unilateral, bilateral, and
multilateral measures including regional actions. Coun-
tries are thus required to amend their domestic legisla-
tion and practices and to conclude agreements imple-
menting the substance of article 26 of the U.N. model
and the accompanying commentary.25 Further refer-
ence to the U.N. work, including its code of conduct,
is found in Section III.B below.
C. European Union
In April 2009, the commission presented a commu-
nication titled ‘‘Promoting Good Governance in Tax
Matters’’ for EU member states, EU potential candi-
dates, and third countries including those receiving EU
development aid.26 For the EU, in order to protect the
financial system from noncooperative jurisdictions and
tax havens, actions to achieve international good gover-
nance in the tax area — including transparency, ex-
change of information, and fair tax competition —
must be implemented. This communication was
adopted by resolution of the European Parliament on
February 10, 2010.
Also, the EU is now discussing an amendment to
the existing measures to promote tax cooperation in
the EU:
18Id., at para. 4.3 states:
although tax evasion is illegal and tax avoidance is not,
both result in the same loss of revenue to the government,
and, by definition, both defeat the intent of the govern-
ment in enacting its taxing statutes. Consequently, mutual
assistance in combating tax avoidance is an important as-
pect of mutual cooperation on tax matters. In addition,
some forms of aggressive tax avoidance are so close to the
line between avoidance and evasion that a Contracting
State is unlikely to know for sure whether the information
it is requesting deals with avoidance or evasion until after
it obtains the requested information. Information on tax
avoidance may be extremely useful to a Contracting State
in its efforts to close possible loopholes in its taxing stat-
utes.
19Id., at para. 5.4.
20Id., at para. 29.2.
21Id., at paras. 29.3 and 29.4.
22Fifth Session of the Committee of Experts on International
Cooperation in Tax Matters, Geneva, Oct. 19-23, 2009.
23The TIEA also states that information must be exchanged
for both civil and criminal matters. See article 5, para. 1 of the
TIEA and para. 39 of its commentary.
24Report of the Fifth Session of the Committee of Experts on
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, at 14.
25Id., at Annex.
26Supra note 5.
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• the proposals — which replace the mutual as-
sistance directive27 — for a directive on adminis-
trative cooperation and a directive on recovery of
claims;
• the proposal for amendment to the savings taxa-
tion directive28; and
• the code of conduct to tackle harmful tax compe-
tition in taxation of companies.
This new approach is the result of the political state-
ment of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council
(May 2008) that, in light of recent events,29 stated that it
is necessary to reinforce the efforts to tackle tax fraud
and evasion, and for this purpose, ECOFIN acknowl-
edges the need for ‘‘implementing, on as broad a geo-
graphical basis as possible, the principles of good gover-
nance in the tax area.’’30 In contrast to the OECD
approach, the EU ‘‘objective is not to target tax havens
per se but to reach agreement with as many third coun-
tries as possible on common principles of cooperation
and transparency.’’31 The outcome will be a provision on
good governance added to the relevant agreements con-
cluded by the EU and the EU member states with third
countries. This provision describes the commitment of
the parties to improve international tax cooperation and
to facilitate the collection of legitimate tax revenues.32
II. Good Governance in Tax Matters
A. The Communication
1. Background
In the EU communication ‘‘Promoting Good Gover-
nance in Tax Matters,’’ the commission adopted the
definition of good governance as presented by
ECOFIN (May 2008).33 ECOFIN defined ‘‘good gov-
ernance in the tax area as meaning the principles of
transparency, exchange of information, and fair tax
competition.’’34
In order for the commission to strengthen the prin-
ciple of tax governance within the EU and internation-
ally, actions that result in better tax governance within
the EU and in third countries must be taken. The EU’s
objective is to strengthen actions to achieve interna-
tional good governance in the tax area as presented in
the contribution of EU finance ministers to the G-20
meeting of March 14, 2009, and ratified by the Euro-
pean Council of March 19-20, 2009. In the communi-
cation, the commission recognizes the importance of
combating not only tax fraud and tax evasion, but also
money laundering, corruption, and terrorism by means
of promoting good governance in tax matters. Further,
the commission stated that there is clearly a growing
global consensus on the need for a continuing coordi-
nated response to this problem, consisting of comple-
mentary initiatives in the areas of financial regulation
and taxation.35 The contents of these initiatives are not
clear, and therefore, some proposals for further re-
search in the area of tax, accounting, and financial
regulation are offered in Section IV.B below.
The goals of this EU communication are to con-
sider the tools to improve and promote good gover-
nance within the EU and internationally, and to in-
crease the scope of coordinated action by EU member
states so that the efforts to promote transparency and
exchange of information are reinforced.
The European Commission acknowledges the work
of the OECD on harmful tax competition and interna-
tional tax cooperation, the importance of the OECD
standards on exchange of information and transpar-
ency, and the commitments made at the Global Forum
on Transparency and Exchange of Information. The
commission proposes ‘‘coordinated action by Member
States to ensure an appropriate follow-up where this is
in the interest of the EU.’’36 For instance, the commis-
sion refers to the proposed derogation of the special
27On February 2, 2009, two proposals of the directive were
presented by the European Commission: the proposal for a
Council directive on administrative cooperation in the field of
taxation (COM(2009)0029 as amended (C6-0062/2009 — 2009/
0004(CNS)); and the proposal for a Council directive concerning
mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes,
duties, and other measures (COM(2009)0028) as amended
C6-0061/2009 — 2009/0007(CNS)).
28The European Commission presented a proposal of No-
vember 13, 2008, amending Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation
of savings income in the form of interest payments
(COM(2008)0727).
29Even though ECOFIN does not mention what recent
events, it could be argued that in addition to the financial crisis,
the interest in exchange of information and transparency is the
result of recent events such as the 2008 Liechtenstein affair and
the collapse of the financial system worldwide.
30ECOFIN Meeting of May 14, 2008, 8850/08 (Presse 113)
at 22.
31Supra note 5, at 7.
32Id., at 23.
33In this communication, the commission proposes actions to
improve tax governance, stating that agreements (which cover
common standards and cooperation, including on tax matters)
are required given that with the current financial and economic
crisis, national budgets and tax systems are under increased
threat, and that the need for international tax cooperation and
common standards has become a regular feature of international
discussions. Id., at 5.
34Supra note 30.
35Supra note 5, at 4.
36Id., at 7.
SPECIAL REPORTS
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL AUGUST 23, 2010 • 613
(C) Tax Analysts 2010. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
arrangements in the savings taxation directive37 and
promotes the adoption of the OECD standards on in-
formation exchange by all member states,38 and by
countries that have saving tax agreements with the
EU39 in which a withholding tax instead of informa-
tion exchange requirement was made. Also, the com-
mission states that it is important for all member states
to move toward automatic exchange of information;
however, in contrast to the OECD standards in which
exchange of information takes place on request, the
EU endeavors to introduce automatic exchange of in-
formation as a compulsory and binding requirement.
2. Ongoing Actions and Proposed Measures
In the communication, ongoing and new actions are
proposed in order to improve good governance at the
EU level and at the international level for all countries,
including specific actions for countries receiving aid
from the EU.
a. At the EU level. At the EU level, the following meas-
ures are presented in the communication:
• The communication mentions the introduction of
two proposals in February 2009 to replace the
mutual assistance directive: one, the proposal for a
Council directive on administrative cooperation in
the field of taxation; and two, the proposal for a
Council directive concerning mutual assistance for
the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties,
and other measures. These two proposals are nec-
essary to reinforce EU action at the international
level against tax fraud and tax evasion.40 Interest-
ingly, in the mutual assistance directive, in addi-
tion to the introduction of automatic exchange of
information41 and the prohibition on member
states to invoke bank secrecy ‘‘for nonresidents as
a reason for refusing to supply information to the
State of Residence,’’ a most-favored-nation clause
in the field of international cooperation has been
introduced.42 According to this principle, a
‘‘Member State has to provide cooperation to
other Member States under the same conditions
as to a third country.’’43 The scope of the applica-
tion of this clause can only be determined once
the proposed mutual assistance directive is
adopted. At the time of this writing, these pro-
posals for directives have not yet been adopted.44
• Application of the EU savings directive to third
countries and dependent and associated territories
of member states is another measure presented in
the communication. Also, in 2008 the commission
proposed to amend this directive in order to ex-
tend the ‘‘coverage of the directive to certain in-
terest payments to EU residents which are chan-
nelled through intermediate tax-exempted
structures established in non-EU countries.’’ At
the time of this writing, this proposed amendment
to the directive has not yet been adopted.
• Another proposed measure is the application of
the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation to all
member states and dependent and associated terri-
tories of member states.
• In EU relationships with the European Economic
Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) and
with Switzerland, actions are being taken that will
result in more administrative cooperation with the
EU. For instance, with Liechtenstein, negotiations
37In this directive, three member states (Austria, Belgium, and
Luxembourg) have a special arrangement in which they charge
EU resident foreign account holders a withholding tax instead of
exchanging information.
38Recently, Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, and San Marino
have endorsed the OECD standards, and Austria, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, and Switzerland have withdrawn their reservations to
article 26 of the OECD model.
39These countries are Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Monaco,
Andorra, and San Marino. Supra note 5, at 11.
40Id., at 10.
41The discussion of the directive on administrative coopera-
tion took place in the Economic and Social Committee and the
Working Party on Tax Questions at the Council of the European
Union. In these discussions, some member states have presented
their reservations about the automatic exchange of information
of article 8. Later, the Presidency of the Council of the Euro-
pean Union (Sweden at that time) prepared a new compromise
text in which a number of categories of income and capital was
established, and to which this method of automatic exchange
would have to apply (article 8, para. 1). Also introduced was the
possibility of establishing a double limit, depending on the cat-
egories for which information is communicated or the amount
that triggers the mechanism (article 8, para. 2). Council of the
European Union, Presidency, Document 15145/09 FISC 139,
Oct. 29, 2009. The amended directive was approved by the Euro-
pean Parliament on February 10, 2010 (P7 TA (2010)0013).
42Article 18 of the Council directive on administrative co-
operation stating that ‘‘Where a Member State provides a wider
cooperation to a third country than is provided for under this
Directive, it may not refuse to provide such wider cooperation to
the other Member State.’’ Council directive on administrative
cooperation in the field of taxation (COM(2009)0029 as
amended (C6-0062/2009 — 2009/0004(CNS)).
43Id., at 7.
44Both directives have been amended by the commission on
request of the member states. In the proposal for administrative
cooperation, some categories and limits to the automatic ex-
change of information were introduced (article 8, paras. 1 and
2). This amended text has been approved by the EU Parliament
on February 10, 2010; see P7 TA(2010)0013. Approval by the EU
Council of this proposal has not yet taken place. In the Directive
on Recovery of Tax Claims, as approved by the EU Council on
March 16, 2010, the exchange of information without request
was also included (art. 6). Council Directive 2010/24/EU, OJ
L84/1 of March 31, 2010.
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on a new ‘‘antifraud agreement are ongoing, in-
cluding on the issue of information exchange for
direct taxation.’’45
• For candidate and potential candidate countries to
the EU and as part of the EU enlargement strat-
egy, good governance should be included as one
of the areas to be addressed at an early state of
the preaccession process.
b. At the international level and for countries receiving aid
for development. At the international level, in May 2008
ECOFIN introduced a provision to be included in rel-
evant agreements to be concluded with third countries
by the EU and its member states. ECOFIN considered
the following text to be appropriate:46
With a view to strengthening and developing eco-
nomic activities while taking into account the
need to develop an appropriate regulatory frame-
work, the Parties recognise and commit them-
selves to implement the principles of good gover-
nance in the tax area as subscribed to by Member
States at Community level. To that effect, without
prejudice to Community and Member States’
competences, the Parties will improve interna-
tional cooperation in the tax area, facilitate the
collection of legitimate tax revenues, and develop
measures for the effective implementation of the
abovementioned principles.
Even though, in the communication, this provision
was not explicitly adopted, the commission made refer-
ence to the negotiation of provisions on good gover-
nance in the tax area with third countries. Also, the
communication states:
the Council should give the Commission suffi-
cient flexibility in its negotiations on wording,
while preserving the substantial elements and ob-
jectives of good governance, so as to be able to
negotiate solutions that best fit the specific case
of each country.47
The EU communication stated that the provision to
be introduced in the agreements should be mentioned
as early as possible in the negotiation of the agree-
ment, and ‘‘in cases where it is known in advance that
the discussion of the principles of good governance in
the tax area will be contentious, or where such prin-
ciples are not understood,’’ the introduction of this
provision should be addressed in advance (for instance,
in trade-related negotiations).48
In general terms, EU member states are required to
include in their future tax agreements with third coun-
tries provisions on transparency and exchange of infor-
mation. The EU has stated that third countries eligible
for development aid49 should also enhance commit-
ments on tax governance. Otherwise, aid funding may
be reallocated to other countries, or in some cases even
canceled.50 This means that for the commission, good
governance in the tax area is exemplified by interna-
tional tax cooperation. Thus, tax agreements to in-
crease transparency and exchange of information
should be concluded with third countries. Third coun-
tries are also asked to change their tax systems in the
field of international cooperation in order to continue
their dealings with EU member states or to receive EU
aid. The specific changes in the tax systems that need
to be made are not presented in this EU communica-
tion; however, it could be expected that these changes
may include provisions to provide automatic exchange
of information, to remove the bank secrecy for nonresi-
dents and residents,51 and to guarantee the privacy of
the information exchanged. These changes may require
constitutional and tax-law amendments in these coun-
tries; therefore, I believe that the EU should also study
the constitutional and legal frameworks of the involved
nations before the provision to promote good gover-
nance is introduced in EU member states and third
countries.
B. European Parliament Resolution
1. Background
The motion on Promoting Good Governance in Tax
Matters was presented by the Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs on February 2, 2010, to obtain a
resolution of the European Parliament on this issue.
This motion was debated and a resolution was adopted
by the European Parliament on February 10, 2010.
The resolution was based on the EU communication,
the proposed Council directives of February 2009 on
administrative cooperation and recovery of tax claims,
and the 2008 amendment to the savings tax directive.
Also, the declarations since 2008 following the G-20
meetings as well as the recommendations of ECOFIN
in May 2008 were taken into account.
45Supra note 5, at 8.
46Supra note 30, at 23.
47Supra note 5, at 11.
48Id.
49The main reason for this approach toward tax and develop-
ment was presented by the commission in the 2009 conference
on ‘‘Tax and Development.’’ For the commission, the financial
and economic crisis has increased the need to secure tax rev-
enues in developing countries, which have been severely hit by
shrinking commodity prices and the contraction of international
trade. Developing countries often suffer high tax losses due to
inefficiencies in their tax systems. Also, the global system of fi-
nancial transactions and the abundance of noncooperative juris-
dictions have made tax evasion feasible and artificial tax avoid-
ance risky.
50Supra note 5, at 12.
51The EU communication and the EU resolution are not
clear on whether the exchange of information will apply to resi-
dents and nonresidents or only to nonresidents.
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The European Parliament took into account the
global consensus at the EU and at the international
level that good governance in the field of taxation
means transparency, exchange of information, and fair
tax competition. The resolution states:
whereas the combined efforts of the G-20 and the
U.N., together with the efforts made as part of
OECD-led initiatives, have produced some prom-
ising results in the area of tax governance;
whereas those results remain insufficient to cope
with the challenges presented by tax havens and
offshore centres and must be followed by decisive,
effective and consistent action.52
One of the main criticisms of the EU toward the
OECD is that until now the exchange of information
takes place only upon request of a tax authority. The
EU advocates for a global standard on automatic ex-
change of information.53 Further, the European Parlia-
ment stressed that:
instead of bank secrecy, automatic information
exchange should take place in all circumstances,
including in all the member States and dependent
territories; welcomes in this respect the Commis-
sion’s proposal on administrative cooperation in
the field of taxation because inter alia, it extends
cooperation between the Member States to cover
taxes of any kind, abolishes bank secrecy and
establishes the automatic exchange of informa-
tion as a general rule.54
In a resolution, the European Parliament con-
demned the role played by tax havens in encouraging
and profiteering from tax avoidance, tax evasion, and
capital flight. The resolution urges member states to
fight against tax havens, tax evasion, and illicit capital
flight. Moreover, in the European Parliament’s judg-
ment, a lack of good governance in tax matters en-
courages tax fraud and tax evasion. Regarding good
governance, the Parliament stated that it ‘‘is under-
stood to mean — transparency, exchange of informa-
tion at all levels, effective cross-border cooperation and
fair tax competition — and as such good governance is
a key element in rebuilding the global economy after
the 2008 financial collapse.’’ The European Parliament
wants to strengthen good tax governance within the
EU so that the EU ‘‘has a political and moral basis
from which to demand good tax governance of third
countries.’’55 For the Parliament, tax governance is a
key element in rebuilding the world economy, and in
order to achieve tax governance, the Parliament pro-
poses that instead of bank secrecy, automatic exchange
of information must take place and be extended to
cover taxes of any kind.
2. Actions of the European Parliament
a. At the EU level. For a genuine policy of good tax
governance, the first step is to clamp down on tax ha-
vens in the EU.56 The second step is the approval of
the directives, and to establish the principle of auto-
matic exchange of information. Further, the European
Parliament acknowledges the importance of reducing
the differences among 27 tax systems, which requires
improving international cooperation, introducing a
common consolidated corporate tax base, and coordi-
nating EU policies in order to enhance the implemen-
tation of antiavoidance rules.57
The Parliament proposes, among others, the follow-
ing actions:
• One proposed action is the adoption of the pro-
posed amendment to the savings tax directive that
(i) ends the temporary derogation that allows Aus-
tria, Belgium, and Luxembourg to avoid exchang-
ing information by applying a withholding tax;
and (ii) extends the scope to cover private com-
panies, trusts, and other forms of investment in-
come. The European Parliament also recalls ‘‘that
the provisions of the Directive should be extended
to Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao, and other juris-
dictions such as Dubai, New Zealand, Ghana,
and certain states of the United States which are
not bound by the Directive and are therefore a
favoured location for tax evaders.’’58
• Another proposal is the acceleration of the con-
clusion of the antifraud agreement with Liechten-
stein, and the negotiation of similar agreements
with Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and Switzer-
land.
52Supra note 6, at Consideration K.
53The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs stated
in the report that:
the OECD framework for combating tax havens is unsatis-
factory; highlights the need to improve the indicator for
achieving the status of a cooperating jurisdiction by, for
example, giving it a qualitative value; is critical of the fact
that this indicator requires the conclusion of a mere 12
tax information exchange agreements; regrets, in this con-
text, that the exchange of information takes place only on
request rather than being a compulsory and binding re-
quirement, and, furthermore, that the OECD allows gov-
ernments to escape its blacklist merely by promising to
comply with the information exchange principles, without
ensuring that those principles are actually put into prac-
tice.
EU Report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs to the EU Parliament, A7 0007/2010 at 8.
54Supra note 6, at para. 3.
55Id., at Consideration H.
56Id., at para. 1.
57Id., at paras. 24 and 25.
58Id., at para. 6.
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• The European Parliament also recommends the
increase of cooperation, including the introduc-
tion of ‘‘the automatic exchange of information
between countries, with a view to facilitating the
recovery of capital moved abroad via illegal activ-
ity to the detriment of the internal market.’’59
This means that in contrast to the OECD work in
which exchange of information takes place on
request, the EU is proposing an automatic ex-
change of information. Whether this requirement
can be applicable to all EU member states is not
clear yet. However, it is clear that in some EU
jurisdictions — such as Austria — which have
recently introduced domestic legislation adopting
the OECD standards in information exchange,
this requirement of automatic exchange has not
been followed. Instead, Austria provides for ex-
change of information upon request and takes the
position that there will not be automatic or spon-
taneous exchange of information.60
• The Parliament also proposes the implementation
of the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation61
in their relations with third countries in a manner
consistent with EU efforts to promote good gov-
ernance in tax matters.
b. At the international level and for countries receiving aid
for development. The EU approach is to promote good
governance in tax matters in the EU Neighbourhood
Policy, Enlargement Policy, and Development Coopera-
tion Policy.
• Regarding third countries, the European Parlia-
ment considers that EU aid funds for development
for a third country should be made conditional on
the compliance of such country:
with good tax governance standards, in-
cluding the effective implementation, on
the basis of legally binding rules, of the
principle of automatic exchange of infor-
mation; stresses in particular that
progress made on tax governance stand-
ards within international forums such as
the OECD and the G-20 should not pre-
vent the European Union from applying
higher standards.62
• Moreover, the European Parliament welcomes the
work in the area of good tax governance from the
G-20, G-8, the U.N., and the OECD, but it con-
siders ‘‘nevertheless, that the commitments made
by the G-20 to date are not sufficient to address
the challenges posed by tax evasion, tax havens,
and offshore centers.’’63
• The European Parliament asks the commission to
report on the ECOFIN (May 2008) recommenda-
tion to include a tax governance provision in all
agreements to be concluded with third countries
by the EU and its member states. Moreover, the
Parliament stresses the need for provisions on
good governance to be negotiated in general or
specific agreements with third countries, and the
need to ensure an effective process for monitoring
their implementation.64
• The European Parliament considers the influence
that the lack of transparency in tax systems of
developing countries has in the collection of tax
revenue by these countries. The Parliament
stresses that ‘‘the tax governance policy should
actively contribute to building sustainable and
transparent tax systems in developing countries.’’
The goals of this policy should be to eradicate tax
fraud and to raise revenue. Moreover, in develop-
ing countries, tax governance will ultimately at-
tract investment insofar as it contributes to legal
certainty, transparency, and stability.65
• The European Parliament also introduces the pos-
sibility to establish coercive measures to promote
good tax governance. For example, the Parliament
mentions ‘‘a special levy on movements to or
from non-cooperative jurisdictions, non-
recognition within the EU of the legal status of
companies set up in non-cooperative jurisdictions
and a prohibition on EU financial institutions es-
tablishing or maintaining subsidiaries and
branches in non-cooperative jurisdictions.’’66
C. The EU Proposal in a Nutshell
The EU resolution and the EU communication con-
tain measures to promote good governance in tax mat-
ters not only at the EU level (including potential EU
59Id., at para. 11.
60C. Hasenauer and J. Prinz, ‘‘Austria: Implementation of
OECD Standard on Exchange of Information,’’ Int’l Tax Rev.,
Feb. 2010.
61The EU Council in December 2008 committed to continue
to fight against illicit finance risks from noncooperative jurisdic-
tions and to fight against tax havens. In this commitment, the
EU Council approved a new work program for the implementa-
tion of the Code of Conduct aiming at eliminating harmful tax
competition in the EU. EU Council meeting of Dec. 2, 2008,
6231/1/08 REV 1.
62Supra note 6, at para. 7.
63Id., at para. 14.
64Id., at para. 12.
65Id., at para. 22.
66Id., at para. 27.
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candidates), but also at the international level (includ-
ing countries receiving EU aid for development). Fur-
ther, the EU resolution explicitly stated that the main
objective of the EU is to achieve a global framework of
automatic exchange of information. For the European
Parliament, the OECD has achieved some results, but
those results are insufficient to address the challenges
posed by tax evasion, tax havens, and offshore centers.
In the EU resolution, the Parliament not only fo-
cuses on the approval of the proposed directives (sav-
ings tax directive, administrative cooperation, and re-
covery of tax claims), the code of conduct, and the
signing of antifraud agreements, but it also provides for
a broader scope of the actions to promote good gov-
ernance than the EU communication. At the EU level,
the Parliament stresses the importance of requiring
international cooperation from all EU member states,
introducing a common consolidated corporate tax base,
and coordinating the EU policies in order to enhance
the implementation of antiavoidance rules by all coun-
tries.
The Parliament also stresses the importance of a
consistent approach to tax governance in the context of
the EU Neighbourhood Policy, the Enlargement Policy,
and the Development Cooperation Policy. As a result,
third countries such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein,
potential EU candidates, and countries receiving EU
aid are also required to comply with the EU standards
for good governance. It should be reasonably expected
that future agreements or commitments by these coun-
tries with the EU and/or EU member states will also
have the requirement to implement automatic exchange
of information and to remove bank secrecy, among
other measures.
Third countries concluding agreements with the EU
and EU member states are also required to comply
with the principles of good governance. Whether the
wording of the provision as presented by ECOFIN in
May 2008 will be implemented has not yet been de-
cided by the European Commission. Thus, the Euro-
pean Parliament has urged the commission to report
and make a decision regarding the contents of the pro-
vision. Finally, the resolution contains incentives and
coercive measures for third countries that are not com-
plying with the EU standards on good governance.
III. Int’l Tax Cooperation Proposals
The OECD (followed to some extent by the U.N.)
and the EU are presenting proposals to enhance inter-
national tax cooperation by means of introducing pro-
visions for transparency and exchange of information
to be applicable not only to OECD countries and EU
member states, but also to non-OECD countries and to
non-EU countries. The EU is also taking a step further
by requesting that third countries apply this framework
of international tax cooperation in order to receive or
continue receiving international aid for development.
A. Good Governance in Tax Matters
The reason why the EU decided to define good gov-
ernance in tax matters as exchange of information and
transparency is neither specified in the EU communica-
tion nor in the EU resolution. The definition was
adopted by ECOFIN in May 2008 and was introduced
as such by the European Commission and the Euro-
pean Parliament. However, one may argue that by do-
ing so, the EU has taken the attention away from the
concept of governments being open, accountable, and
responsive not only to international donors, but also to
citizens. In the past, the European Commission in a
white paper on European governance defined good
governance as containing the following principles:
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness,
and coherence.67 Neither the EU communication nor
the EU resolution referred to the white paper or to any
other definition other than the one presented by
ECOFIN. In contrast to the EU approach, the OECD
and the U.N. have referred to transparency and infor-
mation exchange as measures to promote international
tax cooperation and not as measures to promote good
governance.
B. Forms of Exchange of Information
The European Commission and the European Par-
liament consider that the OECD work on exchange of
information, even though it has made progress, is in-
sufficient. Thus, the EU believes that further actions
need to be taken at the EU level, and also in the rela-
tionships with third countries. The EU’s criticisms re-
garding the OECD work can be summarized as fol-
lows:
• the exchange of information proposed by the
OECD is upon request rather than being a com-
pulsory and binding requirement;
• the OECD framework for combating tax havens is
unsatisfactory given that this framework is not
based on qualitative values, and thus, if a country
concludes 12 TIEAs, the country is regarded as
‘‘substantially implementing’’ the OECD stand-
ards, and therefore, as a cooperative jurisdiction;
and
• the OECD allows ‘‘governments to escape its
blacklist merely by promising to comply with the
information exchange principles, without ensuring
that those principles are actually put into prac-
tice.’’68
The EU’s objectives are twofold. The first objective
is to contribute to the OECD’s work by promoting the
improvement of the OECD standards, but with the
67‘‘European Governance: A White Paper,’’ EU communica-
tion of July 25, 2001, COM(2001) 428 final, at 10.
68Supra note 6, at para. 16.
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goal to make automatic, multilateral exchange of infor-
mation the global standard. The second objective is to
encourage the OECD to involve the European Com-
mission in the peer review exercise that has been initi-
ated in the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and
Exchange of Information in September 2009.69
Even though the wording of the OECD standards in
article 26 of the OECD model and article 5 of the
OECD TIEA states that exchange of information is
made on request — and therefore, other forms of ex-
change such as automatic or spontaneous are not in-
cluded — the commentaries to article 26 of the OECD
model and to article 5 of the OECD TIEA authorize
the countries to include other forms of information
exchange such as automatic and/or spontaneous ex-
change. The U.N. commentary to article 26 of the
U.N. model also includes the possibility for countries
to exchange information automatically and/or sponta-
neously, and it has gone a little further than the OECD
by introducing a specific standard option provision that
can be included in the bilateral tax treaties following
the U.N. model. This standard provision was presented
in Section I.B above, and it states that exchange of in-
formation can be made not only on request, but also
that the competent authorities can agree on exchange
of information on a routine and spontaneous basis.
Moreover, the clause states that the competent authori-
ties may also agree on the type of information or
documents that can be exchanged automatically (rou-
tine basis).
Although the OECD did not introduce an additional
clause for automatic or spontaneous exchange of infor-
mation, one may argue that if a standard provision as
outlined in the U.N. commentary can be introduced in
the OECD commentary to article 26 of the OECD
model or to article 5 of the OECD TIEA, the OECD
will provide countries with the possibility to introduce
such provisions in their bilateral tax treaties or TIEAs.
Only bilateral tax treaties and bilateral (no multilateral)
TIEAs have been concluded. The introduction of such
an additional clause to the wording of article 26 of the
OECD model or article 5 of the OECD TIEA will
only require the approval of both parties to the agree-
ment.
From this analysis, I believe that the EU criticism of
the OECD regarding the form (that is, on request) of
the exchange of information is not accurate, given that
the OECD and the U.N. have stated the possibility for
countries to agree on other forms of exchange of infor-
mation that go further than on request. The problem
with adopting forms other than on request could be
more budget and administrative issues, which result in
countries’ lack of willingness to introduce automatic
exchange of information. One of the issues addressed
by the U.N. deals with the extraordinary costs that
automatic or spontaneous exchange information may
create for the tax administration of developing coun-
tries. It is therefore suggested that the EU institutions
must conduct further research on the administrative,
legislative (constitutional), and budgetary problems of
other countries.
Unfortunately, the U.N. did not follow this broader
approach in its proposed Code of Conduct on Co-
operation in Combating International Tax Evasion,
which included exchange of information on request as
the minimum level for international tax cooperation.
The exchange on request was introduced as a result of
the discussion on whether information should be auto-
matically exchanged or be exchanged on request. Ac-
cordingly, during the discussion of the code, it was
stated that some believed that the code should have an
automatic exchange of information to:
make a strong statement against tax evasion and
to assist developing countries — which might
have trouble achieving the level of knowledge
needed to make a request for exchange of infor-
mation, such as bank account details. Others
noted the potential burden of an over-use of
automatic exchange, including the logistical issues
in achieving effective automatic exchange of in-
formation.70
This approach by the U.N. in its code of conduct
has been recently criticized by the Tax Justice Net-
work, which urged the U.N. to work toward automatic
exchange of information (which is more effective) and
to assist developing countries with implementing such
automatic exchange of information.71
Finally, one may argue that issues such as the op-
tion of introducing incentives and coercive measures
are very important to the EU’s goals for good govern-
ance in tax matters. These incentives and coercive
measures would apply not only to EU member states,
but also to third countries. They would include grant-
ing more or less EU aid for development, enacting spe-
cial levies in trade, and choosing not to recognize the
legal status of companies in third countries that do not
adhere sufficiently to standards of good governance.
However, it can also be argued that such measures
could have negative effects. Right now, the EU goal is
to create a global framework in which automatic ex-
change of information would be the general rule. If the
OECD has — until now — only been able to get its
standards approved by means of introducing an ex-
change of information on request, there is a danger
that when the EU introduces automatic exchange and
69Id., at paras. 16 and 21.
70Supra note 24, at 15.
71Tax Justice Network, Brief to the U.N. Tax Committee,
Dec. 15, 2009.
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uses coercive measures to achieve the exchange, third
countries may respond by introducing coercive meas-
ures against EU member states.72
C. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements
Even though the OECD introduced a multilateral
version of the TIEA, this has not been adopted by
countries. Currently, only bilateral agreements that in-
clude article 26 of the OECD model or that are based
on the OECD TIEA have been concluded. Nonetheless
— and in order to speed up the process of implement-
ing an adequate level of exchange of information —
the OECD has successfully promoted multilateral nego-
tiations toward bilateral agreements for the exchange of
information. Three pilot projects took place, two in the
Caribbean and one in the Pacific, and the result was
that as of February 2010, more than 80 agreements
were signed or are now being concluded. The OECD
states that this initiative ‘‘has allowed a number of
smaller jurisdictions such as Antigua and Barbuda, the
Cook Islands, Samoa, and the Turks and Caicos Is-
lands to quickly put in place a significant network of
agreements with OECD countries.’’73
It is not clear whether these agreements will follow
the TIEAs or whether only the provision presented by
ECOFIN in May 200874 containing the commitment of
countries to promote good governance in tax matters
will be included in EU agreements with third coun-
tries. The European Parliament urged the European
Commission to make a statement regarding the provi-
sion presented by ECOFIN and also to further develop
this provision. Also, the types of agreements that are
going to have a clause to promote good governance are
not explicitly described by the EU. However, one may
consider that these agreements could be bilateral tax
agreements between EU member states and third coun-
tries, partnership agreements between the EU and third
countries, and trade agreements between EU and/or
EU member states with third countries. The way that
negotiation and application of this provision will take
place should be further developed by the European
Commission.
IV. Proposals for Further Research
A. Peer Review and Study of Tax Culture
In order to create an international tax environment
that enhances tax cooperation, the OECD’s first step
was to sign agreements containing OECD standards
for OECD countries; tax havens, including offshore
financial centers; and developing countries. The next
step is for the OECD to carry out a peer review of the
implementation of these agreements in at least 100
jurisdictions that have implemented the OECD stand-
ards. In this review, the legal and regulatory framework
for exchange of information as well as the practical
application of this framework will be addressed. This
peer review began in March 2010 for the first group of
18 jurisdictions.75 The OECD expects to have the first
results of this peer review in 2014.76
I believe that this peer review offers a unique oppor-
tunity to study comparatively the tax culture of the
countries in which these standards have been imple-
mented. In crafting solutions, attention must be paid to
the tax culture of each country and the way in which
that culture will interface with and influence these
changes. For this article, legal culture is defined as the
organization, institutional features, operation of a legal
system (external factors), and the description of values,
beliefs, and attitudes toward law (internal factors). Re-
search carried out in the past by this author in the field
of leasing shows that the differences in culture provide
the local fine-tuning that makes room for a trans-
planted concept. The rules are different in the recipient
country than the ones in the donor country.77
Describing and measuring culture is a difficult task,
and thus, different conclusions can be drawn in accord-
ance with the elements to describe legal culture. For
purposes of analysis of the legal culture in the
OECD’s peer review exercise, the OECD should iden-
tify the specific institutional features and beliefs that
have an influence in the development of tax rules used
to implement the OECD standards. These issues may
include:
• differences in tax systems (for example, common
law, civil law, or Nordic systems);
• the objectives of lawmakers when implementing
the OECD standards (for example, certainty,
transparency, and equality);
72For instance, one may think that countries such as Canada,
the United States, and Chile (who until recently had opposed the
OECD standards) are not going to agree on an automatic ex-
change of information with coercive measures, and the result
could be that these countries will also introduce coercive meas-
ures in their dealings with EU member states and the EU.
73OECD, supra note 1, at 7.
74See Section II.A.2.b of this article.
75These countries are Australia, Barbados, Bermuda,
Botswana, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Denmark, Germany,
India, Ireland, Jamaica, Jersey, Mauritius, Monaco, Norway,
Panama, Qatar, and Trinidad and Tobago. The OECD published
on the OECD website together with the launch of the first group
review, the assessment criteria, the methodology to conduct this
review, and the terms of reference explaining the information
exchange standard countries must met.
76OECD, supra note 1, at 5.
77See I.J. Mosquera Valderrama, ‘‘Leasing and Legal Culture
— Towards consistent behaviour in tax treatment in civil law and
common law jurisdictions,’’ dissertation, 2007.
SPECIAL REPORTS
620 • AUGUST 23, 2010 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL
(C) Tax Analysts 2010. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
• the role and influence of courts with tax compe-
tence, tax lawmakers, taxpayers, tax administra-
tion, and tax advisers in the drafting and applica-
tion of the rules implementing the OECD
standards; and
• the different instruments and strategies used to
implement the OECD standards (for example, law,
resolution of the Ministry of Finance or tax ad-
ministration, and case law).
My approach in tax culture was followed regarding
the place of effective management in order to deter-
mine the tax residence of a legal body. In the analysis
of this issue by Burgers, the main conclusion is that
the ‘‘OECD proposal does not ensure unanimous
views.’’ These differences are due to differences in the
tax systems of the countries in which the place of ef-
fective management is being applied. The approach
toward the development of case law in a mixed system
such as the Netherlands is in contrast to civil-law coun-
tries such as Germany and common-law countries such
as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Like-
wise, the differences in fiscal culture were addressed as
an obstacle to a common approach toward the place of
effective management.78
In the field of development, the OECD has ad-
dressed the issue of culture — for instance, in the
study of the influence of taxation on good govern-
ance.79 As the OECD rightly stated, the approach
toward tax reforms should take into account aspects
that promote local leadership and locally designed so-
lutions in tax reforms that are sensitive to each coun-
try’s specific socioeconomic environment.80
I believe that changes in the field of taxation —
whether introduced voluntarily or involuntarily, by
means of tax reforms promoted by international or-
ganizations, and/or required by investors — must also
take into account the local, economic, institutional,
and social framework of the countries in which the
new changes are going to be applicable. The result of
this new approach may be the acceptance of the tax
changes that these international organizations may re-
quire or impose, and the more efficient way to imple-
ment these changes that may improve not only the ac-
ceptance of the work carried out by international
organizations, but also the institutional framework of
the country itself.
B. Financial Crisis
Given the international tax cooperation proposals of
the EU, U.N., and the OECD, one may argue that the
main contribution of the financial crisis is the political
support of governments to agree on tackling tax eva-
sion by means of implementing standards for transpar-
ency and exchange of information. However, the finan-
cial crisis is not only the result of tax havens and
offshore financial centers. It is also due to the lack of
regulation of financial institutions, including the re-
laxed rules on capital adequacy and accounting. Ac-
cording to Hemmelgarn, the increase in the leverage of
financial institutions was facilitated by the possibilities
in:
[the] Basel II Agreements, which entered into
force in 2008 and gave more scope for financial
institutions to assess their risks as well as by the
introduction of the International Accounting Stand-
ards in 2005, which forced companies to register
immediately gains and losses on financial assets,
leading to more stock volatility.81
Hemmelgarn also argues that the leverage of com-
panies influenced by the differences in tax treatment
between debt and equity and the use of complex finan-
cial instruments82 also contributed given the lack of
regulations and knowledge by lawmakers and tax ad-
ministrations regarding the tax consequences of the use
of such complex tax instruments.
These issues are not easy to solve given the com-
plexity of the use of tax, financial, and accounting
regulations by a country, and also the unwillingness of
countries to change their tax systems. We must take
into account the tax sovereignty of these nations. Some
of those issues were also dealt with in the resolution of
the European Parliament, stating that the financial cri-
sis was due to new types of complex financial instru-
ments and derivatives placed — to a large extent — in
funds domiciled in secrecy jurisdictions, to tax havens
hosting complex financial products, and to off-balance-
sheet liabilities located in tax havens. All of this shows
the risk associated with the lack of good governance
and opaque jurisdictions.83 Even though this article
does not deal with these issues, further research needs
to be done regarding the relationship of taxes with ac-
counting and financial law, and if necessary, research
78I.J.J. Burgers, ‘‘Some Thoughts on Further Refinement of
the Concept of Place of Effective Management for Tax Treaty
Purposes,’’ Intertax, Vol. 35, No. 6/7, 2007, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, at 378.
79Even though the OECD mentioned socio-economics, envi-
ronment, and culture, no further reference was given to the way
that the study of this framework and culture should take place.
80OECD, ‘‘Governance, Taxation and Accountability: Issues
and Practices,’’ Development Assistance Committee, 2008, at 29.
81T. Hemmelgarn and G. Nicodème, ‘‘The 2008 Financial
Crisis and Taxation Policy,’’ Taxation Paper, Jan. 11, 2010, Eu-
ropean Commission, at 9-10.
82Examples of such instruments include derivatives such as
credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations, and the use
of special purpose vehicles, ‘‘which is a legal entity outside the
balance sheet of the financial institution, allows them to bypass
capital rations regulations.’’ Id., at 12.
83Supra note 6, at 6.
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must also be done to introduce changes in the way that
financial institutions are being regulated and super-
vised.84
V. Conclusions and Recommendations
The current work on international tax cooperation is
not only the result of the 2008 financial crisis, but also
a continuation of the work carried out by the OECD,
the U.N., and the EU. Generally, the OECD is promot-
ing the implementation of the OECD standards to en-
hance transparency and exchange of information by
OECD countries and third countries. The OECD Glo-
bal Forum on Transparency has agreed on a peer re-
view on the implementation of these OECD standards
in at least 100 jurisdictions; the first results are ex-
pected in 2014. This peer review was launched in
March 2010 with 18 jurisdictions. The U.N. introduced
article 26 of the U.N. model that follows to some ex-
tent article 26 of the OECD model. The U.N. has also
introduced the Code of Conduct on Cooperation in
Combating International Tax Evasion, which includes
exchange of information for developing countries. All
these issues have been dealt with by the OECD and
the U.N. as international tax cooperation measures.
The EU introduced in ECOFIN (May 2008) the
2009 EU communication and the 2010 European Par-
liament resolution as well as the principle of promoting
good governance in tax matters (that is, transparency
and exchange of information not only for EU member
states and possible EU candidate countries, but also for
third countries, including developing nations and na-
tions eligible for development aid). Both the OECD
and EU approaches promote transparency and ex-
change of information; however, in contrast to the
OECD, the EU has proposed to address these issues as
good governance in tax matters. For this purpose, the
EU calls for the approval of the proposed directives on
administrative cooperation, recovery of tax claims, and
savings tax directive; the introduction of more anti-
fraud agreements; and the introduction of a provision
to promote good governance in tax matters in agree-
ments concluded by the EU or EU member states with
third countries.
Despite the domestic and international measures
adopted by countries and international organizations to
tackle tax avoidance and to enhance international tax
cooperation, the complexity of international businesses
has resulted in the search for new solutions to these
problems. One may argue that globalization also makes
possible an exchange of cultural, legal, and tax issues
as well as solutions to the problems that countries may
face due to the openness of economies and the com-
plexity of international businesses. Therefore, it is sug-
gested that in carrying out the peer review study on the
legal and regulatory framework for transparency and
exchange of information, the OECD needs to give at-
tention to the way that the tax culture of a given coun-
try influences the implementation of this framework.
The OECD should identify the specific institutional
features and beliefs that have an influence in the devel-
opment of tax rules used to implement the OECD
standards.
This approach toward tax culture not only contrib-
utes to a better understanding on the implementation
of the OECD standards, but also contributes to future
tax reform, harmonization, and convergence projects
carried out by international organizations. ◆
84The European Parliament has also called for:
[the] need to revise the current international accounting
standards with the aim of increasing transparency; calls in
this regard for a requirement for the disclosure in compa-
nies’ annual accounts, on a country-by-country basis, of
accounting information relating to tax havens, and sug-
gests an EU public register listing the names of individuals
and undertakings having set up companies and accounts
in tax havens, with a view to unveiling the true beneficia-
ries shielded by offshore companies.
Id., at para. 23.
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